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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE primary focus of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA")I
is environmental cleanup. CERCLA, as amended by the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), 2 retroac-
tively imposes strict and joint and several liability on owners, opera-
tors, generators, and transporters of hazardous substances. 3 The
act attempts to provide for both short and long-term responses to
the presence of hazardous wastes that contaminate, or threaten to
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980 ("CERCLA"), §§ 101-308, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
2. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), Pub.
L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
3. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). This section provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to
the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
[Vol. VI: p. I
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contaminate the environment. 4 Injured parties may recover costs
from: "bankrupt estates, corporate officers, active stockholders, cur-
rent and prior landowners, foreclosing lenders, successor corpora-
tions, lessors and lessees, federal government agencies, and persons
with an unused 'capacity to control' hazardous waste." 5
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous
substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous
substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otheiwise ar-
ranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for
transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned
or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facil-
ity or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or en-
tity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous sub-
stances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration
vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release,
or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response
costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not in-
consistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any
other person consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural
resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such in-
jury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects
study carried out under section 9604(i) of this title.
Id.
4. Congress, in response to a "strong public demand for action in light of
Love Canal and other celebrated dumpsites," enacted CERCLA "to initiate and
establish a comprehensive response and financing mechanism to abate and con-
trol the vast problems associated with abandoned and inactive waste disposal sites."
H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 1, at 22 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125.
5. Douglas M. Garrou, Note, The Potentially Responsible Trustee: Probable Target
for CERCLA Liability, 77 VA. L. REv. 113, 114-16 nn. 9-19 (1991). See, e.g., Smith
Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989) (concluding that general doctrine of corporate succes-
sor liability appropriate in CERCLA contribution claims); Tanglewood East Home-
owners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988) (classifying lending
institution as prior owner and imposing liability under CERCI A for backing devel-
opment of contaminated land); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987) (holding
officer who supervised or arranged for disposal of hazardous waste liable, without
piercing corporate veil to reach corporate officer); New York v. Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985) (construing CERCLA § 107(a)(1) as un-
equivocally imposing strict liability on current owner of facility which releases or
threatens to release, without regard to causation); Vermont v. Staco, Inc., 684 F.
Supp. 822 (D. Vt. 1988) (shareholders who managed and controlled facility held
personally liable under CERCLA as owners or operators); United States v.
Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (holding corporate
officer with responsibility for release liable, without showing officer caused re-
lease); In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943, 948 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987) (hold-
19951
3
Holmes: The Evolution of the Trust: A Creative Solution to Trustee Liabil
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995
4 VILLANovA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
Recently, scholars have questioned whether trustees are in-
cluded as potentially responsible parties ("PRPs") under CERCLA. 6
There is no legal certainty regarding the extent of trustee liability,
but resolution of this issue is important to the reuse of Superfund
sites. At any rate, a trustee's CERCLA liability may depend upon
the ability of the trustee to exercise control over the activities that
caused the contamination. 7 This Article argues that the trust is a
legal instrument which is a viable tool to bring once-contaminated
land back into productive use. This Article also analyzes the com-
ponents of CERCLA liability, lender liability under CERCLA, the
framework of fiduciary ownership and management, judicial inter-
pretations of trustee liability, federal legislative responses, and state
legislation. A case study of the Industri-Plex Site in Woburn, Massa-
ing bankruptcy estates subject to CERCLA); United States v. South Carolina
Recycling & Disposal Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1986) aff'd in part, vacated in
part sub nom. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989) (finding that lessee of site, apart from its role as opera-
tor of site, maintained control over and responsibility for use of property, essen-
tially "standing in the shoes" of property owners); United States v. Maryland Bank
& Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986) (holding foreclosing lender that took
title to parcel of land liable under CERCLA for hazardous waste cleanup); City of
Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1142-43 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
("CERCtA ... facilitates prompt cleanup of hazardous dumpsites . . . by placing
ultimate financial burden upon those responsible for danger.").
6. See, e.g., Kathryn E. Barnhill, Trustees' Reasonable Expectations of Coverage for
1'nvironmental Liability: Old Insurance for New Problems, 39 DRAKE L. REV. 843, 862
(1989-90) (protecting reasonable expectation of fiduciaries, beneficiaries and heirs
against liability for property damage and personal injury resulting from environ-
mental contamination by following continuous exposure definition of "occur-
rence"); Keith M. Casto & Cheryl L. Mattson, Environmental Liabilities for Fiduciaries,
7 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 26 Uun. 3, 1992) (trustees should approach fiduciary du-
ties by conducting a pre-acquisition environmental investigation of property and
by contractually shifting risk of environmental contamination to other parties);
Margaret V. Hathaway, Recent Rulings on Environmental Liability: Big Wins For Lend-
ers, Big Losses for Trustees, 7 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1097 (Feb. 17, 1993) (discussing
ruling in Phoenix v. Garbage Services Co., 816 F. Supp. 564 (D. Ariz. 1993)) [here-
inafter Phoenix II]; Deborah A. Lawrence, Probate & Property, 34 REs GESTAE 561
(1991) (liability for environmental cleanup imposed on any solvent entity with con-
nection to property or facility in question, and no reason to believe trustees will be
immune); Garrou, supra note 5, at 148 (concluding CERCLA liability is a
"nightmare" from which potentially responsible trustee might never awake); Wil-
liam iL. Hoey, Note, Personal Liability of Trustees Under the Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 68 U. DET. L. REV. 73, 96-97
(1990) (stating prudent trustee mnay earn nothing more than passage to financial
ruin [under Superfund] and "[t]he trust is a creature of legal creativity and will
react-by self-extinction if need be."); 11. Lewis McReynolds, Comment, The Unsus-
pecting Fiduciary ard Beneficiary as "'Owner or Operator" of a Hazardous Waste Facility
Under CERCLA, 44 BANLOR L. RExV. 71 (1992) (arguing that extent of potential fidu-
ciarx' and beneficiary liability seems endless; fiduciaries and beneficiaries may be
subject to seemingly unending risk as owners or operators of contaminated
property).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Mo. 1987).
[Vol. VI: p. I
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chusetts demonstrates the successful use of a trust as an instrument
to manage an existing Superfund site.8 By way of the case study and
previous material, this Article concludes by synthesizing the
problems related to trustee liability.
II. CERCLA LIABILITY
To eliminate the adverse health and environmental effects aris-
ing from thousands of dump sites, Congress authorized the Presi-
dent of the United States to act directly to abate any actual or
threatened release of any hazardous substance. 9 The President del-
egated this authority to the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA")' 0 to clean up facilities" where hazard-
ous substances12 have been released13 or disposed.' 4 In 1980, Con-
gress created a fund to enable EPA to undertake cleanup at
contaminated sites, and then obtain reimbursement from responsi-
ble parties. 15 In addition to cleanup costs, Superfund allows EPA to
pursue civil liability for "natural resource damages" 16 and "response
costs" incurred during cleanup.17 These response costs may be re-
covered from entities determined to be PRPs of contaminated
sites.' 8
8. United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., No. ENF (01-87-E005), 1989 EPA Con-
sent LEXIS 137 (D. Mass. Oct. 28, 1989). Stauffer is the only CERCLA consent
decree with EPA that used a custodial trust. Search of LEXIS, ENVIRN library,
ALLEPA file, CUSTODIAL TRUST request (Sept. 8, 1994).
9. CERCLA § 104(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a).
10. See Exec. Order No. 12,580, 52 F.R. 2923 (1987), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 9615.
11. CERCLA defines "facility" to include "any site or area where a hazardous
substance has . . . come to be located." CERCLA § 101 (9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (9).
12. The term "hazardous substance" includes over 700 substances designated
as hazardous under CERCLA § 102(a). See40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (1991). See also CER-
CLA § 101 (a) (14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (a)(14).
13. CERCLA defines "release" as any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring,
emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or dispos-
ing into the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels,
containers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or
pollutant or contaminant). CERCLA § 101 (22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22).
14. CERCLA defines "disposal" as, "the discharge, deposit, injection, dump-
ing, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on
any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent
thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into
any waters, including ground waters." Id. § 101(29), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29).
15. Id. § 111(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)(authorizing initial $1.6 billion federal
trust fund from which name "Superfund" was coined).
16. Id. § 107(a) (4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4).
17. Id. § 107(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. §9607(0(1).
18. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
1995]
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CERCLA authorizes EPA, individual states, or private parties
that conducted a cleanup of a National Priorities List ("NPL") 19 site
to sue and recover their costs.2 0 The concerned party may recover
from: (1) prior owners or operators of a facility from which there is
a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance; 2' (2)
transporters who brought hazardous substances to a facility selected
by the transporter;22 and (3) persons who arranged for disposal or
treatment of the hazardous material at the facility.
23
A. Imposition of Liability
Liability under CERCLA is strict, so it is imposed on responsi-
ble parties without regard to fault or negligence. 24 The liability for
"indivisible injury" is joint and several. 25 Accordingly, a PRP can be
held liable for the entire cleanup by EPA, the state or a private
party. The responsible party has the right to sue other responsible
parties for contribution, asserting both legal and equitable theories
of cost allocation. 26 Because CERCLA liability is retroactive, EPA
may pursue cleanup costs resulting from actions which occurred
prior to passage of the statute. 27 An owner or operator may even be
liable for conduct that was legal at the time it occurred, unless it
was a "federally permitted release."28
The result of CERCLA's liability structure is that a PRP may be
liable for the entire cost of the cleanup, regardless of the amount of
hazardous substance that particular PRP actually released.29 In ad-
dition, EPA, a state, or a private party is able to choose which PRP
or PRPs to sue. CERCLA does not require EPA to sue all other
19. EPA must identify and prioritize releases on the NPL before it can incur
cleanup costs. Id. § 105(a) (8) (A)-(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a) (8) (A)-(B).
20. Id. § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604.
21. Id. § 107(a) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2).
22. CERCLA § 107(a) (4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4).
23. Id. § 107(a) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (3).
24. See, e.g., Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 168; Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at
732-33.
25. See, e.g., Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171-73.
26. Id. at 173.
27. See, e.g., id. at 167-68; Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 732-34.
28. CERCLA § 101(10); 42 U.S.C. § 9601(10). Such releases are in compli-
ance with specified federal and state environmental laws pursuant to a valid federal
permit. Id.
29. See Amland Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F. Supp. 784,
793-95 (D.NJ. 1989). The owner was not entitled to recover most of the $25 mil-
lion spent cleaning up hazardous waste contamination at the facility because the
response action was not in compliance with the National Contingency Plan. Id.
The National Contingency Plan provides the standard for CERCLA cleanups.
CERCLA § 105(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a).
[Vol. VI: p. I
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PRPs, however, any PRP may join other responsible parties in the
action.
B. The "Innocent Landowner" Defense
Superfund allows only three narrow defenses. These can be
asserted when releases are caused solely by an act of God, war or a
third party.30 The third party defense was expanded by SARA to
include an "innocent landowner defense."3  The defense is avail-
able if an owner can establish that when the property was acquired,
all appropriate inquiries were made into the previous ownership, in
an effort to minimize liability. In determining whether a land-
owner had "no reason to know," a court will consider the land-
owner's specialized knowledge or experience.3 2 Furthermore, at
least one court rejected the notion that there is an affirmative duty
to inquire into the existence of hazardous waste when one acquires
an interest in property under any conceivable circumstance.3 3 Spe-
cifically, in United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc.,34 the district
court for the District of Idaho directly rejected the government's
argument that CERCLA required such a preliminary inquiry.35
30. CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
31. Id. §§ 101(35)(a)-(b), 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(a)-(b), 9607(b)
(3). To assert the innocent landowner defense, a defendant has the burden of
proving each of the following four elements by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and the resulting
damages were caused solely by an act or omission of a third party; (2) the third
party's act or omission did not occur in connection with a contractual relationship
(either direct or indirect) with the defendants; (3) the defendants exercised due
care with respect to the hazardous substance; and (4) the defendants took precau-
tions against the third party's foreseeable acts or omissions and the foreseeable
consequences resulting therefrom. Id. § 107(b) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (3).
32. Id. § 101(35) (b), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(b); H.R. RrP. No. 962, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess., at 187-88, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3280, 3281.
33. See United States v. Serafini, 706 F. Supp. 346 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
34. 716 F. Supp. 1341 (D. Idaho 1989). The court stated:
It would have been very easy to draft into the statute [CERCLA] the very
requirements sought by the Government: Congress could have simply
said that some inquiry must be made in every case. But Congress did not
do so. Instead, Congress used terms like "appropriate" and "reasonable"
in describing the necessary inquiry. The choice of such terms indicates to
this Court that Congress was not laying down the bright line rule asserted
by the Government. Rather, Congress recognized that each case would
be different and must be analyzed on its facts.
Id. at 1349.
35. Id. The court determined the transfer from a father to his three children
in an inter vivos trust was more like an inheritance than a private transaction, which
permitted the defendants to successfully assert the innocent landowner defense.
Id.
1995]
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C. Duty to Disclose
CERCLA provides that if a prior owner had actual knowledge
of a release or a threatened release during ownership and subse-
quently transferred ownership without disclosure, the owner will be
held liable for contamination.3 6 Thus, past owners may not assert
the innocent landowner defense. The result is that liability may at-
tach to previous owners who do not actually participate in the dis-
posal of hazardous wastes.
3 7
III. LENDER LIABILrTy UNDER CERCLA'
CERCLA places the owner or operator of a facility among the
parties liable for cleanup costs of Superfund sites. 38 An owner or
operator, however, does not include a person who is merely pro-
tecting a security interest in the property, and not participating in
its management.3 9 Since CERCLA does not define the actions a
security holder may undertake without "participating in the man-
agement of a . . . facility,"40 courts have been left to address the
problem. 4' Courts primarily have examined three areas: (1) fore-
closure liability; (2) operational control liability; and (3) lender
liability.
A. Foreclosure Liability
Foreclosing banks may be subject to CERCLA liability. Even if
they are not contributors to the original contamination, on occa-
sion they can be held liable as owners under CERCLA. One way in
which a bank can be liable is if it holds the property as an invest-
ment, rather than a security on a loan. In United States v. Maryland
Bank & Trust Co.,42 the court held that a bank which purchased
36. CERCLA § 101 (35) (c), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (35) (c).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. § 101 (20) (A) (iii), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (A) (iii). Protecting a security
interest is a passive role compared with the active role of management. CERCLA's
legislative history states that an owner, "does not include certain persons possess-
ing indicia of ownership (such as a financial institution) who, without participating
in the management or operation of a vessel or facility, hold title either in order to
secure a loan or in connection with a lease financing arrangement under the ap-
propriate banking laws, rules, or regulations." H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess., at 36 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6160, 6181.
40. CERCLA § 101(20) (A) (iii), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (A) (iii).
41. Many opinions addressing CERCLA operator liability have noted the
vague statutory definition. See, e.g., Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials
Co., 861 F.2d 155, 156 (7th Cir. 1988).
42. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
[Vol. VI: p. I
8
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol6/iss1/1
THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRUST
property at a foreclosure sale was liable under CERCLA as the
owner of a hazardous waste facility.4 3 Even though the bank did
not contribute to the contamination, the bank was found liable be-
cause it held the land as an investment, not simply to protect its
security interest in the land.44
In Guidice v. BFG Electroplating and Manufacturing Co., 45 the dis-
trict court for the Western District of Pennsylvania would not grant
summary judgment in favor of a bank that foreclosed on a property
that later was found to be contaminated. The court held that a
bank which forecloses on property containing hazardous waste is
not within the security interest exemption and, accordingly, is sub-
ject to CERCLA liability.46
B. Operational Control Liability
CERCLA's security interest exemption only protects those
lenders who hold a security interest in property but do not partici-
pate in the management of a site. 47 Although participation in the
financial aspects of operation is insufficient to warrant CERCLA lia-
bility, participation in the actual operation is sufficient to create
CERCLA liability. In United States v. Mirabile,48 a secured lender that
actively participated in the management of the facility was treated
as an owner or operator. 49 The court found that the lender was
involved in day-to-day management of the business that went be-
yond making financial decisions.
C. Lender Liability
There are two predominant views of lender liability. The first
view is that a lender incurs liability from actual involvement in the
management of a facility. The second view is that a mere "capacity
to control" can incur liability. The potential scope of lender liabil-
43. Id. at 579-80.
44. Id. The court distinguished between a security interest and an investment
from which a bank expects to realize a windfall. Id. The court stated that the
security interest exemption should be read narrowly so as to include only a lender
who held "indicia of ownership to protect a then-held security interest in the land."
Hines, 632 F. Supp. at 579.
45. 30 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1665 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 1989).
46. Id. at 1671-72.
47. CERCLA § 101 (20) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (20) (A).
48. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,992, 20,996 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
49. Id. Officers from the lending institution frequently appeared at the facil-
ity, determined the priority in which orders were to be filled, demanded that addi-
tional sales effort be made and directed manufacturing changes and reassignment
of personnel. Id. at 20,995-97.
1995]
9
Holmes: The Evolution of the Trust: A Creative Solution to Trustee Liabil
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995
10 VILLANoVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
ity was expanded beyond operational control liability in United States
v. Fleet Factors Corp.50 The Fleet Factors court held that a lender may
incur Superfund liability by participating in "the financial manage-
ment of a facility to a degree indicating a capacity to influence the
corporation's treatment of hazardous wastes." 51 Fleet Factors goes be-
yond Mirabile and Maryland Bank & Trust because the court deter-
mined that neither involvement in day-to-day operations, nor
participation in decisions relating to hazardous wastes, is necessary
for a lender to incur liability.52
In contrast to Fleet Factors, the court in In re Bergsoe Metal Corp.53
held that a municipality's capacity, or unexercised right to control
the operations of a facility was insufficient to void a secured credi-
tor's exemption from liability. In other words, the court in Bergsoe
Metal, unlike the court in Fleet Factors, determined that the critical
issue was what the municipality did, not what it could have done.54
50. 724 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Ga. 1988), aff'd, 901 F.2d 1550 (lth Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991). The lender, Fleet Factors Corp. ("Fleet Fac-
tors"), secured its loan through a security interest in a fabric printing company's
("SPW") equipment, inventory, fixtures and facility. Id. at 957. When the owners
of SPW were unable to make payments, the facility ceased operations and filed
bankruptcy. Id. at 958. Subsequently, Fleet Factors foreclosed on the inventory
and equipment and contracted to have unsold equipment sold at auction. Id. Af-
ter the auction, EPA inspected the facility and found drums of hazardous waste
and asbestos contamination. Fleet Factors, 724 F. Supp. at 958-59. EPA then re-
moved the contamination and sought recovery of its costs against Fleet Factors. Id.
at 959.
51. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (1lth Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit stated that "a secured creditor will be liable if its involvement with the man-
agement of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could
affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so chose." Id. at 1558. The court
determined that this standard would encourage lenders to investigate and monitor
the hazardous waste treatments and policies of borrowers, and give lenders incen-
tive to participate in correcting borrowers' hazardous waste problems. Id. at 1557-
58. The only interventions that do not incur liability are "occasional and discreet
financial decisions." Id. The court did not, however, rule on whether Fleet Factors
was liable as an owner or operator under CERCLA § 107(a)(1) or as an "arranger
for disposal" under § 107(a) (3). Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557-58. See also Court
Holds Fleet Factors Liable, Defers Ruling on Basis for Liability, 23 Envt. Rep. (BNA) 2834
(Feb. 26, 1993).
52. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557.
53. 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990). In Bergsoe Metal, a municipal corporation was
a creditor and acquired title to contaminated property as security in a sale-and-
lease-back arrangement to finance construction and operation of a lead recycling
plant. Id. at 670. Its involvement was limited to negotiating and encouraging the
building of the plant, permitting it to inspect and foreclose upon the premises as
stated in the lease, and entering into a work agreement with the debtor and trustee
not to exercise its default remedies under the lease so the workout could proceed.
Id. at 672-73. See also United States v. Nicolet Inc., 29 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1851
(E.D. Pa. 1989).
54. Bergsoe Metal, 910 F.2d at 672-73.
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D. EPA's Lender Liability Rule
In response to Fleet Factors, EPA promulgated its rule on lender
liability.55 This rule attempts to remove any uncertainty surround-
ing the amount of involvement a secured creditor is permitted in
management.56 The rule established a two-prong test of participa-
tion in management to create liability under CERCLA. 57 The first
prong asks whether the bank usurped the borrower's decision-mak-
ing abilities regarding environmental compliance. 58 The second
prong asks whether the lender took responsibility for "overall man-
agement" of the borrower's affairs with respect to either environ-
mental compliance or substantial operational aspects of the
borrower.59 This test does not penalize unexercised capability to
manage on the part of the lending institution; rather, the test sup-
ports and permits active involvement in the borrower's financial
and administrative affairs. 6°
IV. FRAMEWORK OF FIDUCIARY OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT
A. Evolution of the Trust
If one views history as a continuum of experience, the signifi-
cance of the past is that it is a source for learning old ideas anew.
The trust is one equitable tool that has adapted to the needs of the
55. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan;
Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344, 18,382 (1992)(codified at
40 C.F.R. § 300.1100).
56. Id.
57. Id. See also Hathaway, supra note 6, at 1100. In addition to a review of
Phoenix II, the author reviewed three other CERCLA cases which were decided
after EPA promulgated the lender liability rule: Kelly ex rel. Michigan Natural
Resources Comm'n v. Tiscornia, 810 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (holding that
conditioning continued financing on replacing chief executive officer with turn-
around specialist acceptable to bank indicated that bank merely influenced, but
did not control, borrower's decision-making); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Sonford Prod.
Corp., 810 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Minn. 1992) (holding money lender, who foreclosed
on and held property for less than one month, had not participated in manage-
ment of property sufficiently to lose secured creditor exemption); Grantors to the
Silresim Site Trust v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., No. 88-1324-K, transcript of
court proceedings at 89 (D. Mass. Nov. 24, 1992) (holding bank which loaned
money to hazardous waste facility owners and insisted original CEO no longer re-
main in charge entitled to secured creditor exemption, but declining to decide
whether lender liability rule applicable). See also Patricia L. Quentel, EPA Issues
Long-Awaited Lender Liability Rule, 22 Envt. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,637 (October,
1992).
58. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100. See also CERCLA § 101(20) (A), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601 (20) (A).
59. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(1)(i).
60. Id. § 300.1100(c)(l)(ii)(B).
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past, and a review of its origins demonstrates its adaptability to the
changing needs of this modern society.61
Conveyancers of land in medieval England invented the "use,"
which became the ancestor of the modem trust.62 By the early
1400s, the use was common in England for landholding. 63 By the
beginning of the sixteenth century, uses and trusts were disfavored
by the crown.64 In response to these problems, Parliament passed
the Statute of Uses in 1536.65 Although it was believed that uses
would cease to exist and that all estates in land would be subject to
61. Pierre Lepaulle, Civil Law Substitutes for Trusts, 36 YWEI L.J. 1126 (1927).
There is no trust in civil law. Lepaulle wrote:
[Trusts] are like those extraordinary drugs curing at the same time tooth-
ache, sprained ankles, and baldness sold by peddlers on the Paris boule-
vards; they solve equally well family troubles, business difficulties,
religious and charitable problems. What amazes the skeptical civilian is
that they really do solve them!
Id. at 1126.
62. GEORGE BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 2, at 13 (2d ed.
1982). To "enfeoff" is to invest with an estate by feoffment, and to make a gift of
any corporeal hereditament to another. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 474 (5th ed.
1979). The English use has been said to be modeled after the treuhand or salman
developed tinder Germanic Law. BOGERT, supra at 15. The salman was a person to
whom land was transferred in order that he might make a conveyance according to
his grantor's direction. Id. In addition, the Frankish influenced the use of a third
party to act for the beneficiary. Id.; 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD 1 230
(2d ed. 1968) (1898). The Lex Salica employed it by the intermediation of a third
person, who is put in seisin of the lands and goods, to succeed in appointing or
adopting an heir. Id. at 230 (Lex Salica, tit. 46 De adfathamire. Heusler, Institu-
tionem, i. 215). Shortly after the Norman Conquest in 1066, a line of cases began
which saw a man conveying his land to another "to the use" of a third. Id. at 231.
This flourished in the thirteenth century with the arrival of the Franciscan friars
who were forbidden to own land because of their vow of poverty. Id. at 231. Bene-
factors conveyed plots of land to the city for the benefit of the Franciscans. Id.
63. BOGERT, supra note 62, at 14. Because of the strict rules of pleading in
English law, the interests of the "cestui que use" were not enforced by the common
law courts since no writ existed that fit the case. Id. at 21-22. The cestui que use is
the person for whose use and benefit the lands or tenements are held by another.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 208 (5th ed. 1979). Ecclesiastical courts had no jurisdic-
tion to enforce them. As a result, trusts existed only as honorary obligations and
had no clout in any court. Id. The cestui que use has the right to receive the
profits and benefits of the estate, but the legal title and possession reside in the
other. Id. Development of the Court of Chancery brought a change as the custom
evolved to petition the King or his Council in cases where there was no remedy at
law. Id. at 22. The Chancellor, as conscience of the King, decided cases on the
basis of equity and fairness, rather than on technical compliance with writs and
pleadings. Id. Early in the fifteenth century, the petitions to enforce uses and
trusts were recognized by the Chancellor in Equity. Id. See also GEOFFREY R.Y. RAD-
CLIFFE & GEOFFREY N. CROSS, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 134 (3d ed. 1954).
64. BOGERT, supra note 62, at 23. Specifically, they relieved tenants of their
burdens of feudal landholding, enabled religious orders to have the benefit of
land, and afforded greater freedom in the conveyancing of real property. Id.
65. 27 Hen. VIII, c. 10.
[Vol. VI: p. I
12
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol6/iss1/1
THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRUST
the same burdens and rules of tenure and conveyance,66 in fact,
trusts flourished.67 After the Statute of Uses, the term "trust" was
applied to all such equitable interests.68 This became the basis of
modem trust law. 69
B. Modem Background of Trustee Liability
A modem trust is "a fiduciary relationship in which one person
holds a property interest, subject to an equitable obligation to use
that interest for the benefit of another."70 The trustee owes the
beneficiary of the trust a duty to act solely in the beneficiary's inter-
est, without considering personal advantage. 71 Because of the na-
ture of this relationship, a trustee has fiduciary responsibilities and
is expected to show more than ordinary candor, consideration, and
probity in dealings with the beneficiary. 72
A trustee holds legal title to the trust property and generally
has the rights, duties, and liabilities of an owner, except as to the
beneficiaries of the trust.73 Possession of the trust property extends
liability to the trustee, who is obligated to manage the trust for the
benefit of the beneficiary according to any special terms or condi-
66. BOGERT, supra note 62, at 25.
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 67-73 (1959) (detailing the im-
pact of Statute of Uses on trusts). In 1925 the Statute of Uses was repealed in
England by the Law of Property Act. 12 & 13 Geo. 5, ch. 16, § 1(7). The common
law judges construed the Statute of Uses and determined when the use was exe-
cuted and the cestui que use was given the legal estate. BOGERT, supra note 62, at
25. Still, a large number of uses were left unaffected and were recognized and
enforced only in Chancery. Id. at 27.
68. BOGERT, supra note 62, at 27.
69. Id. See also THEODORE F.T. PLUcKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COM-
MON LAW 598 (5th ed. 1956) (detailing history of Statute of Uses and of real
property).
70. BOGERT, supra note 62, at 1. There are six basic elements of the trust: (1)
the trust property is the interest in property, real or personal, tangible or intangi-
ble; (2) the setfior of the trust is the person who intentionally creates it; (3) the
trustee is the individual or entity that holds the trust property for another's bene-
fit; (4) the legal title to the trust property usually remains in the trustee; (5) the
beneficiary is the person for whose benefit the trustee holds the trust property;
and (6) the trust instrument is the document in which the settlor expresses an
intent to have a trust and sets forth the trust terms, including details as to benefi-
ciaries and their right and the duties and powers of trustees. RESTATEMENT (SEC.
OND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 67, at § 2, cmts. c-e, i-j.
71. BOGERT, supra note 62, at 3.
72. Id.
73. IIIA WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 265.4 (4th ed. 1988). The
owner of the equitable interest in trust property is the beneficiary of a trust. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 67, § 277. The ownership of title to
the trust assets, however, remains in the trustee. Id. § 277, cmt. a. Thus, the bene-
ficiary is not liable to third parties because he or she is without legal title to the
trust property.
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tions.7 4 Trustee liability is not limited to the value of the trust estate
when the trustee is personally liable for a contract, or incurs tort
liability from circumstances involving the trust.75 The common law
interpretation of trustee liability could be superseded by a statute
such as CERCLA.76
V. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF TRUSTEE LIAILITY
The definition of "person" under CERCLA includes individu-
als, corporations, and commercial entities and does not specifically
include or exclude trustees.77 Courts have wrestled with the status
of a trustee as an owner or operator under CERCLA. Because
trustee liability is in the early stages of development, it is premature
to state that a body of law has developed with respect to any particu-
lar type of trust. In some cases, courts are willing to hold trustees
liable, irrespective of personal involvement. Yet, in other cases, the
analysis focuses on: (1) whether the trustee remained active or pas-
sive; (2) whether the trustee had the ability to influence decisions
concerning the management of the property; (3) whether the
trustee was a participant in the management of the property in
either a corporate or individual capacity; or (4) whether the trustee
tested the property for contamination during possession and pro-
ceeded with cleanup efforts after notifying the appropriate regula-
tory authorities. The following decisions demonstrate the
complexity of the disputes surrounding trustee liability and the dif-
ficulty in assigning liability for cleanup costs.
A. Liability Imposed on Trustees
1. Statutory Trust: United States v. Bliss
Statutory trustees of the Houlihan Nursery Company were
found jointly and severally liable under CERCLA section 107 (a) (3)
for response costs in United States v. Bliss.78 The Nursery was a Mis-
souri corporation until the state revoked its charter in 1983 for fail-
74. THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS provides:
Where a liability to third persons is imposed upon a person, not as a
result of a contract made by him or a tort committed by him but because
he is the holder of the title to property, a trustee as holder of the title to
the trust property is subject to personal liability, but only to the extent to
which the trust estate is sufficient to indemnify him.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 67, § 265.
75. IIIA FRATCHER, supra note 73, § 265.4.
76. See United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 124 (1958).
77. CERCLA § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
78. No. 84-2086C(1), 1988 WL 169818 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 27, 1988).
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ing to comply with registration requirements. 79 The defendants,
who were officers and directors of the corporation, became statu-
tory trustees pursuant to Missouri law.80 In 1981, EPA determined
that a site owned by the Nursery required remedial action, and in-
curred response costs in connection with removal of waste.8 The
court found that imposition of liability upon the statutory trustees
was proper because they were the legal representatives of the now
defunct corporation. 82 Thus, the court concluded that the trustees
were liable under CERCLA "to the extent of corporate assets which
came into their hands."83
2. Realty Trust: United States v. Burns
In United States v. Burns, 4 the district court for the District of
New Hampshire addressed the issue of trustee liability when the
government brought an action to recover response costs incurred
due to the release of hazardous substances from a real estate trust 5
The court addressed two issues: (1) whether the trustee could be
considered an owner or operator of the site; and (2) if the trustee
were an owner or operator, whether personal participation in con-
duct which violated CERCLA was required in order to be liableY6
The court determined that a liberal construction of CERCLA's
purpose, "to protect and preserve public health and the environ-
ment,"87 required the court to hold that the trustee was an owner of
the site. The court reasoned that a broad definition of "owner" is
supported by CERCLA's legislative history which indicates that the
79. Id. at *2.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Bliss, No. 84-2086C(1), 1988 W'L. 169818, at *9. The court explained that
a person need not be a current owner or operator of a facility to be liable, since
CERCLA § 107(a) (2) applies to prior owners who owned the facility at the time of
the hazardous waste disposal. Id. at *8, Furthermore, § 101 (21) defines "person"
to include corporations. Id.
83. Id. at *9.
84. No. C-88-94-L, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17340 (D.N.H. Sept. 12, 1988).
85. Id. The defendant moved for dismissal of the action, claiming that as the
trustee and beneficiary, he never owned the land and never personally partici-
pated in conduct that violated the statute. Id. at *1. In response, the government
argued that the defendant was an owner of the site within the meaning of CER-
CIA, and that personal participation was not necessary for individual liability. Id.
Specifically, the government alleged that the defendant was both the sole trustee
and beneficiary of the trust, which held the industrial site when hazardous sub-
stances were disposed. Burns, No. C-88-94-L, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17340, at *1.
86. Id. at *3.
87. Id. (citing Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy Inc., 805 F.2d
1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986)(obliging the court to construe CERCLA's provisions
liberally to avoid frustration of the legislative purposes)).
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term is meant to include "equivalent evidence of ownership."88
The court analogized the position of a trustee to that of a lessee8 9
and concluded that Congress did not intend for a responsible party
to be able to avoid liability through the use of a trust.90
Additionally, the court found that the trustee would be liable
for response costs regardless of personal participation in conduct
that violated CERCLA.91 First, the court noted that an owner is lia-
ble under CERCLA regardless of whether it is also an operator of
the facility.92 Furthermore, CERCLA does not require a causal rela-
tionship between ownership and disposal for there to be liability.93
Finally, CERCLA does not require an owner to participate in man-
agement in order for liability to attach. 94 Accordingly, since the
court determined that the trustee was an owner, he was liable re-
gardless of personal participation in running the facility.
3. Closely Held Corporate Trust: Quadion Corp. v. Mache
In Quadion Corp. v. Mache,95 the district court for the Northern
District of Illinois denied a motion to dismiss a complaint under
CERCLA made by the trust, its beneficiaries and its current and
previous trustees. The defendant trust owned seventy percent of a
corporation which Quadion's predecessor-in-interest purchased. 96
After Quadion acquired the corporation, it learned that the real
property was contaminated. 97 Quadion's first count sought contri-
bution from the trust and trustees under CERCLA.98 The defend-
ants argued that they were only shareholders of the corporation,
88. Burns, No. C-88-94-L, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17340, at *3 (citing H.R. REP.
No. 96-172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 36 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6160,
6181).
89. Id. at *3-4 (citing South Carolina Recycling, 653 F. Supp. at 1003 (finding
lessee liable as owner under CERCLA § 107); Maryland Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp.
at 578-80 (finding security interest exception to liability of owner to be narrow
exception to general rule of strict liability)).
90. Id. at *4 (citing Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1044-45; IliA FRATCHER, supra
note 73, at §§ 265, 265.1 (trustee holding legal title to trust property could be
liable for obligations as owner of property)).
91. Id. at *4,
92. Id. (citing Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1052; United States v. Stringfellow, 661
F. Supp. 1053, 1063 (C.D. Cal. 1987)).
93. Burns, No. C-88-94-L, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17340, at *4 (citations
omitted).
94. Id. (citing United States v. Argent, 21 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1354, 1356
(D.N.M. 1984)).
95. 738 F. Supp. 270 (N.D. IlI. 1990).
96. Id. at 272-73.
97. Id. at 273.
98. Id.
[Vol. VI: p. I
16
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol6/iss1/1
THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRUST
not owners, and that the plaintiff failed to establish that defendants
exercised sufficient control over the corporation to be considered
operators. 99 The court found that as shareholders of a closely held
corporation, they could be liable under CERCLA, even if there
were insufficient facts to warrant piercing the corporate veil.1°°
The court adopted a test for determining when a shareholder
of a closely held corporation can be liable under CERCLA. The
test focuses on authority to control waste management, and respon-
sibility undertaken or neglected. 10 1 After applying this test, the
court concluded that the owners and the closely held corporation
were not legally distinct and denied the defendants' motion to
dismiss.102
4. Corporate Liquidating Trust
In Rollins Environmental Services (FS), Inc. v. Wright,10 3 the plain-
tiff, a Delaware corporation, contracted with the defendant to per-
form cleanup work at the defendant's Arkansas facility.' 0 4 The
defendant was also a Delaware corporation, but had already dis-
solved and petitioned the court to appoint trustees. '0 5 The plaintiff
sought payment from the trustees and filed suit when the trustees
failed to make any payment. 0 6 The court found that the relevant
statute applied to liquidating trusts, 10 7 and concluded that it had
personal jurisdiction over the trustees, and that the trustees' due
process rights were not violated. 08 The trustees succeeded to all
99. Quadion, 738 F. Supp. at 274.
100. Id. at 274.
101. Id. at 274-75. The court stated that evidence to consider includes: au-
thority to control waste handling practices, such as whether the individual is an
officer or director; distribution of power within the corporation, including posi-
tion in the corporate hierarchy and percentage of shares owned; responsibility un-
dertaken for waste disposal; and attempts to prevent unlawful hazardous waste
disposal. Id.
102. Id. at 275.
103. 738 F. Supp. 150 (D. Del. 1990).
104. Id. at 151.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 152.
107. Ro!/ins, 738 F. Supp. at 152.
108. Id. The trustees argued their due process rights were violated because
they lacked sufficient contacts with Delaware. Id. The court, however, concluded
that the litigation was related to the trustee defendants' contacts with the state
since they were appointed liquidating trustees of a Delaware corporation. Id. at
153. Furthermore, since the trustee defendants purposefully established "mini-
mum contacts" with Delaware and previously sought protection of the state's
courts, the court stated they could "reasonably anticipate being hailed into court"
in Delaware. Id. at 153-54. Finally, the court noted that its exercise of in personam
jurisdiction did not offend traditional notions of "fair play and substantial justice."
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right, tide and interest of the corporation, and had the power to
defend all suits necessary to wind up the corporation's affairs.109
The court stated that any person with a claim against the dissolved
corporation now had a claim against the trustees. 110 The trustees
were authorized to defend any actions necessary to conclude the
corporation's affairs, including actions based on legal obligations of
the dissolved corporation."' Thus, the court denied the defend-
ants' motion to dismiss. 112
The court in Waste Management of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Uniroyal,
Inc.113 denied a trustee of a liquidating trust's motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim for which
relief may be granted. In Uniroyal, a waste management company
brought an action to recover past and future response costs at two
Superfund sites. The company sought damages from the trustees
of CDU Holding, Inc., Liquidating Trust ("CDU Holding"). 114
The first issue the court addressed was whether the trustees
were subject to personal jurisdiction. 15 The court determined that
CERCLA provides for nationwide service of process by the United
States but not for private causes of action. 1 6 Yet, the court found
that the state's long arm statute was applicable, and concluded that
it had personal jurisdiction over the trustees.1 7 In addition, the
court found that the defendants' contacts with the state were suffi-
cient to comply with due process. 1 8 The court reasoned that bring-
Rollins, 738 F. Supp. at 154. Thus, the court concluded that it did not violate due
process to assert jurisdiction over the trustee defendants. Id.
109. Id. at 154.
110. Id.
111. Rollins, 738 F. Supp. at 154-55.
112. Id. at 155.
113. No. 91-C-1020-5, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12003 (W.D. Wis.June 2, 1992).
114. Id. at *1. The defendants were involved in a manufacturing process that
resulted in spent solvents, solvent sludge and dry waste scrap disposal at the two
sites. Id. at *3-4. After several transfers, mergers, and corporate transactions, cer-
tificates of dissolution were filed for Uniroyal and upon dissolution, assets were
transferred to CDU Holding Liquidating Trust. Id. at *4. Waste Management
sought to hold the defendants Uniroyal Holding, CDU Holding, and the trustees
liable for costs of response and damages incurred up to that time at its landfill,
together with future response costs as successors to the defendant Uniroyal. Uni-
royal, No. 91-C-1020-5, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12003, at *4-11.
115. Id. at *12.
116. Id. (citing FED. R. Crv. P. 4(c)).
117. Uniroyal, No. 91-C-1020-5, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12003, at *14-15. The
trustee defendants, including CDU Holding, assumed responsibility for the liabili-
ties incurred by Uniroyal, Inc. for the generation and disposal of hazardous sub-
stances, and the transfer of assets and reorganization justified inferring
responsibility for liabilities arising in Wisconsin. Id. at *13-14.
118. Id. at *15-16.
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ing successor defendants into a forum where they were permitted
to do business did not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. 1 9 Accordingly, the court denied the motion to
dismiss. 12 0
The second issue addressed by the court was whether the com-
plaint should be dismissed against CDU Holding for failure to state
a claim for which relief could be granted.' 2 ' The court found that
CERCLA preempted state dissolution proceedings12 2 and there-
fore, the actions of the trustees as successors-in-interest did not au-
tomatically relieve Uniroyal or CDU Holding of liability.12 3
5. Bank Trusts
The court in City of Phoenix v. Garbage Service Co. ("Phoenix
1") 124 found that although status as a trustee alone did not trigger
CERCLA liability, the possibility that the trustee may have taken
other actions that could bring it within CERCLA's definition of
owner justified denial of a partial summary judgment motion.12 5
The only issue presented to the court was whether the defendant,
Valley National Bank ("VNB"), was an owner under CERCLA. 126
The court concluded that liability did not attach based only on
VNB's role as executor or trustee and determined that there was a
question of fact regarding whether VNB "bore the indicia of owner-
ship" necessary to be liable under CERCLA. 127
The court in City of Phoenix v. Garbage Service Co. ("Phoenix
11") 128 squarely addressed the issue of VNB's liability under CER-
CLA. In Phoenix II, the court began its analysis by determining
whether VNB was either an operator or an owner of the landfill.' 29
The court did not find that the defendant was liable as an operator
119. Id. at *16. The court noted that as far back as 1955, liquid waste prod-
ucts were generated which resulted in two sites being placed on the NPL. Id.
120. Id. at *16.
121. Uniroya4 No. 91-C-1020-5, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12003, at *16-17.
122. Id. at *17.
123. Id.
124. 33 Env't Rep. Gas. (BNA) 1655 (D. Ariz. Apr. 5, 1991).
125. Id. at 1655. Pursuant to CERCLA § 107, the city filed to recover response
costs incurred in cleaning up an allegedly contaminated landfill site which it ac-
quired during condemnation proceedings. Id. The defendant, Valley National
Bank ("VNB"), asserted that neither as executor of a testamentary estate, nor in its
capacity as trustee, did it possess any of the rights of ownership. Id. at 1655-56.
126. Phoenix 1, 33 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1656.
127. Id.
128. 816 F. Supp. 564 (D. Ariz. 1993).
129. Id. at 567-69.
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under CERCLA because as a trustee it was not involved in the daily
admininstration of the landfill.1 30
However, the court held that VNB was liable under CERCLA as
an owner of the landfill.1 3 1 In determining liability, the court ex-
amined "whether a trustee, as the holder of legal title to property,
may be held liable under CERCLA for cleanup costs as an 'owner'
even though he played no role in the contamination of the prop-
erty." 13 2 The court held that a trustee may be liable as an owner
under section 107 of CERCLA despite only having "bare legal tide."
The court reasoned that CERCLA does not impose a culpability re-
quirement for ownership liability. 1 33 The court relied on legislative
history 34 and commentators 3 5 to support the proposition that
CERCLA's definition of owner includes trustees who merely hold
legal title to property. The court recognized the only exception to
title holder liability under CERCLA: under CERCLA section
101 (20) (A), "lenders who hold 'indicia of ownership' primarily to
protect [their] security interest" are exempt from liability. 36
B. Liability Not Imposed on Trustees
1. Land Trust
In Premium Plastics v. LaSalle National Bank,'3 7 the plaintiffs
filed a contribution suit against LaSalle National Bank ("LaSalle")
alleging that as trustee of a contaminated property, LaSalle was re-
130. Id. at 567. The court stated that under CERCLA, liability as an owner
only attaches where the defendant has control over day-to-day administration of a
facility, and rejected the plaintiff's contention that VNB's status as trustee gave it
such authority to control. Id. The court noted that the evidence clearly showed
that VNB did not enter into or negotiate contracts for waste disposal, and that VNB
was only involved in matters of the estate, not the landfill. Id. at 567.
131. Id. at 569.
132. Phoenix II, 816 F. Supp. at 568.
133. Id. While the court acknowledged the difficulty in assessing liability in
excess of the value of the trust's assets, the degree of culpability had nothing to do
with owner/operator liability under CERCLA. Id. at 568. "The trigger to liability
under § 9607(a) (2) is ownership or operation of a facility at the time of disposal,
not culpability or responsibility for the contamination." Id. at 567 (quoting Nurad,
Inc. v. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 846 n.198 (4th Cir. 1992)).
134. Id. at 567. The court noted that CERCLA's legislative history "seems to
take for granted that any titleholder is an 'owner' under the statute." Id. at 567
(citing H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6160, 6181).
135. Id. at 567-68. The court stated that the consensus of commentators is
that CERCLA's definition of owner includes trustees even if they only hold legal
title. Id. at 567 (citations omitted).
136. Phoenix II, 816 F. Supp. at 568 (quoting CERCLA § 101(20) (A), 42
U.S.C. § 9601 (20) (A)).
137. No. 92-C-413, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16119 (N.D. IIl. Oct. 22, 1992).
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sponsible for the hazardous waste disposal that occurred at the
site. 138 The court dismissed the plaintiffs' contribution claim 39
and granted LaSalle's motion for summary judgment holding that
as a trustee, the bank was only a title holder and not an owner or
operator under CERCLA.140
The court's analysis recognized that aside from a relationship
based on legal title, a land trustee's title is insignificant.' 4 1 Because
LaSalle was only a title holder and took no active part in the prop-
erty or venture, it was not an owner or operator of the site.' 42 For
that reason, the court held that CERCLA did not impose liability on
LaSalle.' 43 In addition, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument
that if LaSalle's request for summary judgment were granted, other
defendants would claim they were not owners, and plaintiffs could
not recover. 44 The court looked to the plain language of the trust
agreement, and concluded the beneficiary retained all control, and
was to be considered the owner of the site. 145 Accordingly, the
court refused to "subject an innocent party such as LaSalle to liabil-
ity in order to assure that plaintiffs have a source of recovery for
their expenses related to this matter."' 46
2. Contingent Remaindermen of Family Trusts
In Nurad, Inc. v. Win. E. Hooper & Sons,14 7 the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
the defendants, and found that they were not liable under CER-
CLA. 148 Nurad argued the defendants were liable as prior owners
and operators because they held stock in the company and were
138. Id. at *1-3. The plaintiffs spent over $100,000.00 in cleanup costs to rem-
edy the situation and subsequently filed suit for contribution costs. Id. at *4-5.
139. The plaintiffs alleged they were entitled to contribution since they paid
costs above their pro-rata share. Id. at *4. The court noted only a tort-feasor has
the right to contribution under the state statute. Premium Plastics, No. 92-C-413,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16119, at *5. The plaintiffs claimed they did not cause the
contamination, therefore, they were not jointly liable and were not entitled to con-
tribution. Id. at *6.
140. Id. at *10.
141. Premium Plastics, No. 92-C-413, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16119, at *10 (not-
ing trustee is legal fiction and ownership truly rests in beneficiary).
142. Id. at *10-11.
143. Id.
144. Id. at *11.
145. Premium Plastics, No. 92-C-413, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16119, at *11.
146. Id. at *12.
147. 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992).
148. Id. at 844.
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remaindermen in a family trust. 149 The Fourth Circuit agreed with
the district court that ihe defendants were not owners or operators
since they did not have sufficient authority to control or prevent
disposal. 150 The court noted that although the defendants were
company officers, their authority was completely subordinate to
that of their father, who was the president and majority stockholder
of the company.' 5' The district court found "neither [defendant]
had the ability nor the capacity to exercise such control over the
operations since their father . . . retained all decision-making au-
thority over the company including the daily operations at the fin-
ishing plant."'152  Thus, the district court declined to hold the
defendants liable under CERCLA,153 and the Fourth Circuit
affirmed.154
3. Avoiding Liability as Trustee
In Con-Tech Sales Defined Benefit Trust v. Cockerham,155 the
trustee successfully avoided liability by testing the property for con-
tamination and initiating a cleanup. The plaintiffs sought to re-
cover CERCLA response costs and to assess liability for future
expenses, and the defendants moved for summary judgment argu-
ing the plaintiffs' cleanup did not comply with the National Contin-
gency Plan ("NCP"). 156 In deciding whether to grant a summary
149. Nurad v. Win. E. Hooper & Sons Co., No. WN 90-661, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17090, *21-22 (D. Md. Aug. 15, 1991) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 966 F.2d 837
(4th Cir. 1992). According to Nurad, the defendants were in a position to influ-
ence decisions made by the company because they were officers and directors at
the time of disposal. Id. at *22. The defendants alleged they never participated in
disposal decisions, and that they had neither controlling company stock, nor
power to control company operations. Id.
150. Nurad, 966 F.2d at 844.
151. Id.
152. Nurad, No. WN 90-661, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17090, at *30. The evi-
dence established that the father was solely responsible for running the company
and made all major corporate decisions by voting the majority of shares of stock
placed in trust after his father's death. Id. at *31 n.23.
153. Id. at *31-32.
154. Vurad, 966 F.2d at 844.
155. No. 87-5137, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14624 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 1991).
156. Id. at *3, 7. Plaintiffs purchased the property ("Exton Parcels") in 1986,
and later excavations uncovered a trench filled with hazardous wastes allegedly
trucked to the site by the defendants. Id. at *6. The plaintiffs removed 9,700 tons
of waste, but 4,700 tons still remained, so they brought suit to recover response
costs incurred and to assess liability for future expenses. Id. at *6-7.
The defendants sought partial summary judgment on the basis that no legal
obligation existed to defray response costs incurred because the plaintiffs allegedly
conducted their cleanup in a manner inconsistent with the National Contingency
Plan ("NCP"). Con-Tech, No. 87-5137, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14624, at *7. The
court considered three issues in deciding whether to grant the motion: (1)
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judgment, the court analyzed the retroactivity of the 1990 version of
the NCP, which requires "'substantial compliance' with the appro-
priate regulations." 57 The unamended version of the NCP, how-
ever, has been interpreted by courts as requiring strict adherence to
specified requirements.158 The court evaluated the plaintiffs'
claims under the 1990 NCP substantial compliance standard, but to
the extent it imposed additonal requirements, the court applied
the unamended NCP standard. 59
The court stated the plaintiffs' cleanup action should be con-
sidered consistent with the NCP if it was in substantial compliance
with the NCP requirements, and produced a "CERCLA-quality
cleanup." 60 Since the plaintiffs could recover if they substantially
complied with the NCP, the court denied the motion for summary
judgment. 161
V. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
A. Innocent Landowner Defense
The "Innocent Landowner Defense Amendment of 1993,"'1"
was introduced to Congress by Representative Curt Weldon. The
Bill would amend CERCLA to provide specific requirements for the
innocent landowner defense and would apply to trustees and other
entities who acquire contaminated property. A purchaser of real
property would have the benefit of a rebuttable presumption that
all appropriate inquiries into the previous ownership and uses of
the property were made if it is established that "immediately prior
to or at the time of acquisition he obtained a Phase I Environmen-
tal Audit."' 63
whether the amended version of the NCP applied; (2) the standard of compliance
required of plaintiffs; and (3) whether the plaintiffs' response action was a removal
or a remedial action. Id. at *8.
157. Id. at *9. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.700 (1990).
158. Con-Tech, No. 87-5137, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14,627, at *9. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 300.71 (1988).
159. Con-Tech, No. 87-5137, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14,624, at *10.
160. Id. at *19 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(3)(i) (1990)).
161. Id. at *28-30.
162. H.R. 570, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). A version of the Bill was intro-
duced previously as H.R. 2787, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
163. Id. The Bill would redesignate subparagraphs (C) and (D) of CERCLA
as subparagraphs (D) and (E), and insert after subparagraph (B) a new subpara-
graph (C) which would provide:
(C) (i) A defendant who has acquired real property shall have established
a rebuttable presumption that he has made all appropriate inquiry ... if
he establishes that, immediately prior to or at the time of acquisition, he
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The audit would be performed by an environmental profes-
sional,1 64 in order "to determine or discover the obviousness of the
presence or likely presence of a release or threatened release of
hazardous substances on the real property."1 65 The audit would re-
quire review of previous ownership and uses of the property. 166
These inquiries would determine whether the prospective owner
searched for reasonably available documented or visual evidence of
hazardous substances. After the search, an owner would avoid
liability for contamination which occurred prior to ownership.
Furthermore, if the audit should reveal the presence or likely pres-
ence of a release or threatened release of hazardous substances,
the buyer would be required to take "reasonable steps" consistent
with current technology and engineering practice to confirm the
absence of any releases in order to claim the rebuttable
presumption.167
B. Fiduciary and Lender Liability
Representative John LaFalce introduced legislation which ad-
dressed the issue of trustee liability.168 The Bill sought to limit the
liability under CERCLA and the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act ("RCRA") 169 of fiduciaries, lending institutions, and others
holding indicia of ownership primarily to protect a security inter-
est.' 70 The Bill would provide that those who hold indicia of owner-
ship primarly to protect a security interest and who do not
obtained a Phase I Environmental Audit of the real property which meets
the requirements of this subparagraph.
Id.
164. Id. An "environmental professional" is defined as, "an individual, or an
entity managed or controlled by such individual who, through academic training,
occupational experience and reputation (such as engineers, environmental con-
sultants and attorneys), can objectively conduct one or more aspects of a Phase I
Environmental Audit." Id.
165. Id.
166. H.R. 570. The information reviewed during an audit consists of the re-
corded chain of title for a period of 50 years, reasonably available aerial photo-
graphs, recorded environmental cleanup liens, reasonably obtainable
governmental records which document releases, and a visual site inspection of the
property and immediately adjacent properties. Id.
167. Id. The information must be maintained in writing by the purchaser in
order to claim the presumption of being an innocent landowner. Id.
168. H.R. REP. No. 1450, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
169. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") §§ 3001-5006, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6921-56 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
170. H.R. 1450.
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participate in management are not owners or operators under CER-
CLA and RCRA. 171
The Bill would exempt a fiduciary or trustee from being an
owner or operator under CERCLA.- 72 A fiduciary or trustee who
acquires ownership or control of a facility without prior manage-
ment participation is considered exempt from liability arising out
of actions taken by previous owners.1 73 Liability would be imposed,
however, on a trustee or fiduciary "who willfully, knowingly, or reck-
lessly causes or exacerbates a release or threatened release of a haz-
ardous substance ... to the extent that the release or threatened
release is attributable to the fiduciary's or trustee's activities."'' 7 4
The Bill would not prevent actions against an estate's assets held by
the fiduciaries or trustees in their representative capacities.' 75
C. Asset Conservation
In the 102d Congress, SenatorJake Garn introduced a Bill' 7 6
entitled the "Asset Conservation and Deposit Insurance Protection
Act of 1991." 7 7 The Bill would amend the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Act1 7 8 to limit the liability of trustees and others acting in a
fiduciary capacity. The Bill would apply to insured depository insti-
tutions and mortgage lenders when acting in a fiduciary capacity. 179
The limitation on liability would insure depository institutions
against liability under any federal law imposing strict liability for the
release or threatened release of a hazardous substance from certain
171. Id. The Bill defines "indicia of ownership" as any interest in a facility
acquired to secure loan payment, indebtedness or obligation in the course of pro-
tecting a security interest. Id. Participation in management is considered to mean
actual, direct control over a facility by one who holds a security interest, and which
divests the debtor of such control. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. H.R. 1450. The proposal did not specifically address the issue of liability
arising from a failure to stop a release or threatened release of a hazardous
substance.
175. Id.
176. The Bill was not reintroduced in the 103d Congress. Earlier versions of
the Bill were S. 2319, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) and S. 2827, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1990).
177. S. 651, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
178. 12 U.S.C. § 1811-33e (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
179. S. 651. The Bill defined "fiduciary capacity" to include those "acting for
the benefit of a nonaffiliated person as a trustee, executor, administrator, custo-
dian, guardian of estates, receiver, conservator, committee of estates of lunatics, or
any similar capacity." Id.
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properties.8 0 Liability would be limited to the actual benefit con-
ferred on the "institution by a removal, remedial, or other response
action undertaken by another party."'' Mortgage lender liability
also would be limited in a similar manner. 182 However, this limita-
tion would not apply to mortgage lenders in a fiduciary capacity.
The proposal also addresses the "unexercised capacity to influ-
ence" which would exempt both the insured depository institution
and mortgage lender from liability, "based solely on the fact that
the institution or lender has the unexercised capacity to influence
operations at or on property in which it has a security interest." 83
The limitation on liability would not apply to three groups: (1) any
person that caused or contributed to the release of a hazardous sub-
stance forming the basis for liability; (2) any person who failed to
take reasonable steps to prevent the continued release of a hazard-
ous substance forming the basis for liability, including discovery
prior to, or after acquisition or termination of the lease; and (3)
any person who actively directed or conducted operations resulting
in the release of hazardous substances forming the basis for
liability. 184
VI. STATE LEGISLATION
Seven states have addressed the issue of fiduciary and trustee
liability under environmental laws.' 8 5 The states' approaches can
be divided into three categories. In the first category are North
Carolina, Rhode Island, Utah and Virginia. The statutes of these
states set forth the following enumerated discretionary powers.
First, the statutes provide for an inspection of property held in a
fiduciary capacity to determine the level of compliance with envi-
ronmental laws, in addition to those rights and remedies set forth
by any will, trust, or other document. 18 6 Second, any necessary ac-
180. These properties included those acquired through foreclosure, held in
fiduciary capacity, held by a lessor pursuant to the terms of an extension of credit,
or those subject to financial control or oversight pursuant to the terms of an exten-
sion of credit. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. S. 651.
184. Id.
185. See ALA. CODE § 19-3-11 (1990); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-7-20-24, 13-7-20.1-
14 (West 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-27 (8.1) (1991): R.I. GEN. LAAWs § 18-4-26
(Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-50-110 (32) (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-1-
109 (1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57(t) (Michie Stipp. 1994).
186. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-27(8.1)(a); R.I. GEN. LAws § 18-4-26(1)(a); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 75-1-109(1)(a); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57(t) (1).
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tion may be taken on behalf of the trust or estate to prevent or
remedy any violation.' 8 7 Third, a fiduciary is allowed "to accept
property in trust if.. . any property . .. is contaminated by any
hazardous substance or is being used or has been used for any activ-
ity directly or indirectly involving hazardous substances which could
result in liability to the trust or impair the value of its assets." l ,,
Fourth, settlements and compromises are permitted "at any time
and all claims against the trust or estate which may be asserted by
any governmental body or private party involving the alleged viola-
tion of any environmental law." 189 Fifth, a fiduciary can "disclaim
any power granted by any document, statute, or rule of law which
may cause the fiduciary to incur personal liability under any envi-
ronmental law."' 90 Sixth, the fiduciary is able to decline to serve
because of a conflict of interest.' 91 Seventh, the fiduciary is entitled
to charge the cost of any authorized inspection, review, abatement,
response, cleanup, or remedial action against the income or princi-
pal of the trust or estate. 192
The second category of states consists of Alabama and Tennes-
see. These two states include the seven previously discussed provi-
sions in their statutes, 93 and also state that a fiduciary in its
individual capacity shall not be considered an owner or operator of
any property of the trust or estate for purposes of any environmen-
tal law. 194
Indiana has two statutes that limit the liability of creditors and
fiduciaries as to petroleum facilities and underground storage
tanks.' 95 Essentially, creditors and fiduciaries are not liable unless
187. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-27(8.1)(b); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-4-26(1)(b); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 75-1-109(1)(b); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57(t)(2).
188. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-27(8.1)(c); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 18-4-26(l)(c); UTAII
CODE ANN. § 75-1-109(1)(c); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57(t) (3).
189. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-27(8.1)(d); R.I. GEN. LAws § 18-4-26(1)(d); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 75-1-109(1)(d). The Virginia statute does not contain this provision.
190. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-27(8.1)(e); R.I. GEN. LAws § 18-4-26(l)(e); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 75-1-109(1)(e); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57(t) (4).
191. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-27(8.1)(f); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-1-109(1)(f); VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.1-57(u) (not permitting power to decline to serve, but permitting a
fiduciary already appointed to resign because of potential environmental liability
of trust or estate assets). Rhode Island does not have this provision in its statute.
192. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-27(8.1)(g); R.I. GEN. LAws § 18-4-26(1)(g); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 75-1-109(3); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-57(t) (5).
193. ALA. CODE § 19-3-11 (a) (1)-(6); TENN CODE ANN. § 35-50-110(32) (A) (I)-
(B) (i). The Alabama statute provides that a fiduciary shall have these powers
whether or not set forth in the instrument. ALA. CODE § 19-3-11 (a).
194. ALA. CODE § 19-3-11(d); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-50-110(32) (B) (ii).
195. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-7-20-24, 13-7-20.14(c) (West 1994).
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they have exercised actual and direct managerial control of the pe-
troleum facility or underground storage tank.196
VII. THE INDUSTRI-PLEX SITE CASE STUDY
In 1989, a consent decree was signed in United States v. Stauffer
Chem. Co. for the remediation of the Industri-Plex Site ("Site").1 97
As a result of the settlement, the Industri-Plex Site Remedial Trust
("Remedial Trust") and the Indutri-Plex Site Custodial Trust ("Cus-
todial Trust") were established.' 98 This is the first custodial trust
used at a Superfund site in the United States. 199 While the possibil-
ity of trustee liability remains, the experience at the Site is instruc-
tive because it uses a trust in a manner which makes the trust part
of the legal solution to the problems of a contaminated site. In
addition, it not only incorporates remediation through the Reme-
dial Trust, but plans for two contingencies: (1) sale via the Custo-
dial Trust; or (2) management of the property through a long-term
trust if the land cannot be remediated, to facilitate sale of the prop-
erty. 20 0 The plan is to return the land to productive use as part of
infrastructure and public transportation development.20 1 Thus,
CERCLA's statutory goal of providing a permanent solution to the
maximum extent possible would be fullfilled.2°2
This case study begins with an overview of background infor-
mation on the Site, and an explanation of the interrelationship be-
tween the consent decree, the Remedial Trust, the Custodial Trust,
and the long-term trust to demonstrate how they work in unison.
Additionally, this case study analyzes how the provisions of the Cus-
todial Trust are incorporated and how the issue of trustee liability is
addressed. From this analysis, the practitioner will be able to obtain
a working knowledge of a legal mechanism that provides a solution
to an expensive and time-consuming environmental problem.
196. Id.
197. Industri-Plex Site Remedial Trust I, Industri-Plex Site Fact Sheet [hereinaf-
ter Fact Sheet] (Jan. 5, 1993) (on file with author).
198. Id. The Remedial Trust was formed to conduct and pay for the cleanup,
and represents the parties who are potentially liable for the contamination, includ-
ing approxiamately 22 current and former owners of the site. Id. The Custodial
Trust was created by the consent decree to hold, manage and sell a parcel of the
site, the proceeds of which will go to the City of Woburn, EPA and members of the
Remedial Trust. Id.
199. See generally Stauffer, No. ENF (01-87-E005), 1989 EPA Consent LEXIS
137.
200. See generally Fact Sheet, supra note 197, at 1-2.
201. Id.
202. CERCLA § 121(b)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1).
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A. Background of the Site
The Site is a 245-acre industrial park located in Woburn, Mas-
sachusetts.203 From the mid-1800s until 1969, the Site was used to
manufacture chemicals, leather, textiles, and paper products.20 4
Later, EPA designated it as a Superfund site.20 5 The pollution dis-
covered included animal hides and residues emitting noxious
odors, which were buried at the Site after being used to manu-
facture glue.20 6 Both the groundwater and soil at the Site are
contaminated.207
The remedies needed to clean up the site include treating the
soil, hide piles, wetlands, and groundwater. 20 8 Clean soil will be
mixed with soil containing high levels of heavy metals and a geotex-
tile layer will be added to prevent physical contact with contami-
nants. 20 9 In areas which release noxious odors, soil will be placed
over a drainage layer, which will rest on top of an impermeable
synthetic layer and a gravel layer.210 At the wetlands portions of the
203. Fact Sheet, supra note 197, at 1. The Site is open land which contains
streams, ponds, utility fight-of-ways, roads, railroads and some operating commer-
cial businesses. Id. Sixty acres are used by commercial businesses while the re-
maining 185 acres are undeveloped. Id. The anticipated future use is to have 110
acres for commercial use, 35 acres for infrastructure and local transportation, and
100 acres for wetlands and open land. Id.
204. Industri-Plex Site Remedial Trust, Industri-Plex Site Chronology [hereinaf-
ter Chronology] (Jan. 5, 1993) (on file with author). Before 1853, the land was
undeveloped and there was no known owner. From 1853 until 1968, various
chemical companies controlled the site including: (1) Woburn Chem. Works,
1853-63 (manufactured chemicals for textiles, leather and paper and disposed of
wastes in pits, streams and sewers); (2) Merrimac Chem. Co. (manufactured acids
and pesticides and left inorganic wastes on the site); (3) Monsanto Chem. Co.,
1929-31 (similar products and wastes as Merrimac Chem. Co.); (4) New England
Chem. Industries, Inc., 1934-36 (manufactured animal hide glues and gelatin); (5)
Consolidated Chem. Industries, 1936-61 (same as New England Chem. Industries,
Inc.); (6) Stauffer Chem. Co., 1961-68 (same as prior owner); (7) Mark-Phillip
Trust (created four piles of hide wastes which released odors from decomposi-
tion). Id. The Mark-Phillips Trust is one of the successive owners of the property,
and is separate from the interim custodians, long-term custodial, and remedial
trusts. Id.
205. Fact Sheet, supra note 197, at 1. In the 1970s, construction activity at the
Site uncovered accumulated by-products and wastes. Id. at 2. Citizens complained
to state agencies about odors and notices of violation were issued by the Depart-
ment of Environmental Quality Engineering. Subsequently, EPA added the Site to
its list of priority hazardous waste sites in 1982. Id.
206. Id. at 1.
207. Id.
208. Chronology, supra note 204, at 2.
209. Id. Permeable soil caps will be used to allow liquids and gases to flow
through. Id.
210. This will provide a barrier which will restrict the flow-through of liquids
and gases. Chronology, supra note 204, at 2. Underneath the impermeable layer, a
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Site, sediments will be covered with clean soil to restore wetland
habitat, and lost wetlands will be replaced by creating a new wet-
land area.21' An interim remedy for groundwater contamination
will treat hot spot areas and several wells will be installed to monitor
effectiveness.2 1 2 This procedure is expected to permanantly rem-
edy the groundwater contamination and will address the removal of
metals. 213 The Remedial and Custodial Trusts will play a pivotal role
in the remediation and reuse of the property. Remediation and
final use are intertwined because, if remediated, the property can
be sold. In the event the land cannot be remediated, there must be
a long-term management plan.2 1 4
B. Custodial Trust Provisions
The consent decree defines the Custodial Trust as a trust estab-
lished "for the purposes of, among other things, receiving, holding,
and realizing value from real property and other assets."2 1 5 In addi-
tion, the trust has all the responsibilities and obligations under fed-
eral and Massachusetts law of a private, non-charitable
landowner. 21 6 Generally, the Custodial Trust can sell or convey the
property once all remedial action is complete.21 7 Furthermore, the
gas collection system will be built to treat gases produced by decomposition of
organic hide wastes. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Chronology, supra note 204, at 2.
215. Stauffer, No. ENF (01-87-E005), 1989 EPA Consent LEXIS 137, at *7-8.
The Mark-Phillip Trust was required to convey all of its property to the Custodial
Trust. Id. at *28. The consent decree outlines the Custodial Trust's general obli-
gations concerning the Mark-Phillip Trust, including: receiving and holding
property in any form received; managing and maintaining the property until sold;
complying with institutional controls; providing access to the Site; subdividing, lo-
cating purchasers and negotiating terms of sale; granting options and making con-
tracts concerning real estate; and paying proceeds of sales into an escrow account.
Id. at *30-31, app. IV, §§ 6.01-09.
216. Id. at *32.
217. Id. at *34. "Remedial action" is defined as "the work required by this
Consent Decree, including the [Remedial Design/Action Plan], with the excep-
tion of Long-Term Operation and Maintenance." Id. at *11. However, there are
two alternative exceptions to this provision: (1) EPA and the State may determine
all remedial work is completed at a given parcel and all institutional controls are in
place; or (2) EPA and the State may agree to a sale to assure both performance of
remedial action and implementation of institutional controls. Id.
With regard to the Mark-Phillip Trust property, the trust is specifically author-
ized to sell all salable portions of the property to a single buyer, even if the poten-
tial sale of individual parcels would generate more revenue. Id. at app. IV, § 3.03.
The salable portions must be sold not later than four years from the date of certifi-
cation of completion of remedial work unless a longer time is agreed to. Stauffer,
No. ENF (01-87-E005), 1989 EPA Consent LEXIS 137, at app. IV, § 3.03. If any
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Custodial Trust is not permitted to assign interests in the property
without advance approval of the United States in consultation with
the State.218 Any net proceeds realized from sale of the property
must be paid by the Custodial Trust to the escrow account.21 9 In
addition, the Custodial Trust must establish and fund a long-term
trust if EPA, the State and the setdors agree that any of the property
is unsalable. 220
Institutional controls, 22' which generally run with the land, are
binding on the Custodial Trust. 222 Until implementation of the
controls is complete or a determination is made that they are not
required, no settlor or successor may sell any possessory interest in
the property without written approval from EPA and the State. 223
Additionally, settlors and successors-in-title may not disturb or mod-
ify implemented institutional controls unless the action is consis-
tent with the consent decree.22 4 The consent decree requirements
terminate "upon completion of the work, as certified by EPA in
consultation with the Commonwealth or determined by the
Court."2 2 5 However, certain requirements remain in effect until
portion of the property is deemed unsalable, the trustee is to provide for the custo-
dial care of the unsalable property after all salable portions are sold. Id. at app. IV,
§ 3.05. For a further discussion of the Custodial Trustee's obligation to provide for
unsalable property, see infra note 220 and accompanying text.
218. Id. at *34-35.
219. Stauffer, No. ENF (01-87-E005), 1989 EPA Consent LEXIS 137, at *34.
Net proceeds are distributed in amounts of 10% of the first $3,000,000 and the
proceeds in excess of $10,000,000, up to a total of $645,000, to the City of Woburn.
Id. at *33-34. Any monies due to the Remedial Trust are also to be repaid and the
balance of the proceeds are then to be distributed in accordance with the escrow
agreement. Id. at *35-38.
220. Id. at *31-33. If the Custodial Trustee determines any part of the prop-
erty is unsalable, it must submit a report stating the reasons for the conclusion to
the Remedial Trustee, EPA and the State. Id. Only after the Trustees, EPA and
the State agree that all reasonable efforts have been made to sell the property may
it be declared unsalable. Stauffer, No. ENF (01-87-E005), 1989 EPA Consent
LEXIS 137, at *31-33. Once this is determined, the Custodial Trustee may estab-
lish a long-term trust to manage the property. Id.
221. The consent decree defines "institutional controls" as, "the land use re-
strictions and other regulations and controls designed ... to maintain the integrity
and prevent the unauthorized disturbance of the caps and other structures that
will be constructed at the Site." Id. at *9-10.
222. Id. at *42.
223. Stauffer, No. ENF (01-87-E005), 1989 EPA Consent LEXIS 137, at *42-43.
224. Id. at *43. Upon receipt of a written request by a proposed successor-in-
title, EPA and the State are required to provide a written statement concerning the
current owner's compliance with institutional controls within thirty days. Id. at
*43-44.
225. Id. at *92.
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the parties agree otherwise and the court approves.2 26 In addition,
termination of the consent decree will not affect any covenants not
to sue.227
The consent decree contains provisions which address Custo-
dial Trustee liability. The Custodial Trustee is only liable to the
beneficiaries for negligence, gross negligence, bad faith or willful
misconduct.2 28 Furthermore, the Custodial Trustee is not required
to expend personal funds or incur financial liability while perform-
ing its duties.22 9 Also, settlors may be held jointly and severally lia-
ble for any failure by the Custodial Trust to comply with the
consent decree.2 30 Additionally, noncompliance is imputed to the
settlors rather than the Custodial Trust or the escrowee of the es-
crow.23 1 Moreover, provisions in the covenants not to sue contain
reservations by the United States and the State of Massachusetts
against settlors. 23 2
C. Remedial Trust
The Remedial Trust portion of the consent decree contains
two provisions that pertain to the Custodial Trust. The first provi-
226. Id. Such requirements include: institutional controls, settlors' coordina-
tor, annual reports, access, dispute resolution, stipulated penalties, retention and
delivery of records and notices. Id.
227. Stauffer, No. ENF (01-87-E005), 1989 EPA Consent LEXIS 137, at *92.
228. Id. at app. IV, § 8.01.
229. Id. at app. IV, § 8.05.
230. Id. at *36-37.
231. Stauffer, No. ENF (01-87-E005), 1989 EPA Consent LEXIS 137, at *36-37.
In addition, the Custodial Trust and its trustees will not be considered owners or
operators of any of the property at the site, solely on the basis of the Custodial
Trust's ownership and disposition of the property by the Trust in accordance with
the consent decree. Id. at *37. This presumption, however, is subject to the condi-
tion that they do not conduct or permit others to perform any activities other than
those specified in the consent decree. Id. at *78-88.
232. Id. at *84-85. Specifically:
The United States and the Commonwealth reserve all rights against
settl[o]rs with respect to all other matters, including but not limited to:
(1) claims based on a failure by any Settl[o]r to meet a requirement of
this Consent Decree; (2) claims based on the failure of any Settl [o] r who
is a Landowner or any Successor-in-Interest (including the Custodial
Trust) to comply with any applicable requirements [regarding institu-
tional controls or access]; (3) liability arising from the past, present or
future disposal, release or threat of release of Hazardous Substances
outside of the site and not attributable to the Site; (4) liability for the
disposal of any Hazardous Substances taken from the Site; (5) liability for
groundwater contamination ... or for soil contamination that causes or
contributes to groundwater contamination; or (6) liability for damages
for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources.
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sion provides for the payment by the Remedial Trustee of Custodial
Trustee expenses incurred pursuant to the consent decree.2 33 The
decree also covers interest-free loans to the Custodial Trustee for
arranging property sales. 234 Furthermore, the Custodial Trustee
may submit a request and invoice to the Remedial Trustee at any
time for additional funds.235 The second provision authorizes the
Remedial Trustee to pay to the long-term trustee an amount the
Custodial Trustee determines necessary to care for property to be
held by the long-term trust.236
The consent decree also addresses the Remedial Trustee's lia-
bility. Like the Custodial Trustee, the Remedial Trustee is only lia-
ble for gross negligence or willful misconduct in relation to duties
under the agreement.237 Furthermore, the consent decree does not
require the Remedial Trustee to expend personal funds or other-
wise incur any financial liability while performing duties if repay-
ment or indemnity is not reasonably assured.238
D. Long-Term Trust
The purpose of providing for a long-term trust is to receive,
hold and manage unsalable property transferred to it pursuant to
the consent decree. 239
The trustee of the long-term trust must receive and hold title
to the real property, comply with institutional controls, provide ac-
cess to property, insure the Custodial Trust Property against loss
due to casualty or third-party liability and comply with all relevant
provisions of the consent decree. 240 The trustee's duties concern-
ing distribution of property and termination of the trust are also
233. Id. at app. I11, § 5.03. Payment by the Remedial Trustee is subject to
approval of the Management Committee, which is made up of the donors in day-
to-day transactions. Id. at app. 1l1, § 3.01.
234. Id. at app. IIl, § 5.03.
235. Stauffer, No.ENF (01-87-E005), 1989 EPA Consent LEXIS 137, at app. li1.
§ 5.03.
236. Id. The amount must be approved by EPA and the State, and may in-
clude, but is not limited to, trustee's fees, insurance, maintenance and security. Id.
After approval by the Management Committee, payment is required within thirty
days after receipt of approval by the Remedial Tnstee. Id.
237. Id. at app. III, § 8.02. The Remedial Trustee's responsibilities include:
holding, administering, depositing, securing, investing and using funds as re-
quired by the consent decree, and following donors' and managament commit-
tee's directions. Id.
238. Id. at app. III, § 8.06.
239. Stauffer, No. ENF (01-87-E005), 1989 EPA Consent LEXIS 137, at app.
IV, ex. 1, § 2.02.
240. Id. at app. IV, ex. 1, § 3.01.
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specified. 24' The trust terminates after all property is distrib-
uted.2 42 Any balance of the Custodial Trust fund must be distrib-
uted to tax exempt charitable, religious, scientific, literary, or
educational organizations.2 43 Furthermore, the trustee is urged to
exercise its discretionary power to distribute such balance to organi-
zations concerned with preserving the environment. 244
Trustee liability in the Custodial Trust and the long-term trust
are the same except for one limitation on liability. The long-term
trustee is to be liable only for negligence, gross negligence, or will-
ful acts or omissions in relation to its duties, but not for bad
faith. 245
VIII. DISCUSSION
This discussion analyzes the many facets of trustee liability.
First, it reviews the application of the innocent landowner defense
to trustees as owners or operators. Next, it discusses the status of
trustees, highlighting the particular liability problems for trusts,
and how legal solutions affect different types of trusts. It also con-
siders various legal tests for liability and summarizes the law of
trustee liability. Additionally, this discussion addresses the problem
of pre-acquisition handling of property by trustees, and proposes a
solution which focuses on how a trustee can attempt to avoid or
minimize liability. Finally, it shows how the Industri-Plex Site
model goes beyond the legal solutions proposed, and provides fur-
ther protection and reduced CERCLA liability.
A. The Innocent Landowner Defense
The issue of whether a trustee is entitled to the innocent land-
owner defense under CERCLA section 107(b) (3) is a problem fac-
ing many trustees. Because "due care" and "precautions against
foreseeable acts or omissions of a third party" are undefined, it is
difficult to determine whether the innocent landowner defense ap-
241. See generally id. at app. IV, ex. 1, § 4.01. Distribution by the trustee is
discretionary, but property is to be distributed to the City of Woburn, the United
States, the State, or any other appropriate governmental unit if the transferee
agrees to accept it. Id.
242. Id. at app. IV, ex. 1, § 4.02.
243. Stauffer, No. ENF (01-87-E005), 1989 EPA Consent LEXIS 137, at app.
IV, ex. 1, § 4.02.
244. Id.
245. Id. at app. IV, § 8.01.
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plies in a given case. 246 The court in Pacific Hide & Fur held there is
no absolute duty to inquire into the existence of hazardous waste
when obtaining an interest in property.2 47 However, the case did
not provide a bright line test to guide trustees in exercising due
care and taking the necessary precautions. As a practical matter, a
trustee must determine precisely what is required to take advantage
of the statutory defense.
Representative Curt Weldon's proposal would clarify this issue
because it provides specificity and outlines requirements a trustee
and other entities should follow when acquiring contaminated
property.24 8 More importantly, the proposal sets forth a demarca-
tion line between successive owners. If an owner complies with and
documents the inquiries and searches required by the statute, then
the task of determining liability is simplified. Thus, innocence may
be adjudicated on the basis of records kept by the owner.
B. Owner or Operator
Another issue which must be determined is whether a particu-
lar trustee is an owner or operator. The solution to this problem is
more difficult than that of the innocent landowner. A distinction
must be drawn between voluntary ownership of a party acquiring
property and involuntary acquisition by a secured lender. If the
acquisition is voluntary there is more flexibility and opportunity to
protect an interest than if the acquisition is involuntary.
While Representative Curt Weldon's proposal distinguishes
prior owners through specific checks on the background and use of
a property, it does address the situation where an environmental
hazard occurs between lending and foreclosure. Senator Jake
Garn's proposal 249 addresses this problem, which was raised in Berg-
soe Metal,250 by exempting depository institutions and mortgage
lenders from liability for the unexercised capacity to influence op-
erations at or on property in which it has a security interest. Yet not
246. CERCLA § 107(b) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3). In relevant part, CER-
CIA states that no liability will exist if the defendant can demonstrate he exercised
"due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned," and "he took pre-
cautions against forseeable acts or omissions of" a third party. Id.
247. Pacific Hide & Fur, 716 F. Supp. at 1348-49. For a further discussion of
this case, see supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
248. For a further discussion of Representative Curt Weldon's proposal, see
supra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
249. For a further discussion of SenatorJake Garn's proposal, see supra notes
175-83 and accompanying text.
250. Bergsoe Metal, 910 F.2d at 668. For a further discussion of this case, see
supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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every situation permits such a "hands off" approach. The new EPA
Lender Liability Rule attempts to bridge this gap.25 I This is a direct
response to the problems noted in Maryland Bank & Trust, Mirabile,
Guidice, and Fleet Factors.25 2 The Lender Liability Rule does not,
however, address the similar problems faced by trustees.253
C. Different Types of Trusts
One approach to the problem of trustee liability focuses on the
type of trust involved. Most problems arise in the context of statu-
tory trusts, realty trusts, closely held corporations, liquidating trusts
and trustee titleholders. The statutory trustee's role in Bliss was suf-
ficient to incur liability as the statutory legal representative. 2 54 In
Burns, liability for the realty trust arose irrespective of personal par-
ticipation.2 55 In Quadion, the court found that a closely held corpo-
ration was liable without piercing the corporate veil because it was
wholly owned by the trust.25 6 In Rollins and Uniroyal, the corporate
liquidating trusts were found to have stepped into the shoes of the
predecessor and were therefore liable.25 7 Finally, in Phoenix II, the
bank trustee was held liable as an owner under CERCLA section
107, "even though the trustee [held] only bare legal title." 258
In contrast, the use of the land trust and contingent remainder
family trusts have fared better. In these situations, the trustees were
not held liable. In the case of the land trust, the Premium Plastics
court found the trustee did not incur CERCLA liability merely by
251. For a further discussion of EPA's Lender Liability Rule, see supra notes
55-60 and accompanying text.
252. For a further discussion of these cases, see supra notes 42-51 and accom-
panying text.
253. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100. It penalizes control of environmental compli-
ance decision making and overall management of environmental compliance. Id.
Left intact is the permissible management of internal financial and administrative
affairs of the property by the lender. Id.
254. Bliss, No. 84-2086C(1), 1988 WIL 169818, at *9. The decision was also
influenced by the trustee assisting in loading drums of hazardous waste and living
on the property. Id. For a further discussion of this case, see supra notes 78-83 and
accompanying text.
255. Burns, No. C-33-94-L, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17340, at *4. For a further
discussion of this case, see supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
256. Quadion, 738 F. Supp. at 274. For a further discussion of this case, see
supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text.
257. Rollins. 738 F. Supp. at 150; Uniroyal, No. 91-C-1020-5, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12003, at *15-17. For a further discussion of these cases, see supra notes
103-23 and accompanying text.
258. Phoenix 11, 816 F. Supp. at 564-68. For a further discussion of this case,
see supra notes 124-36 and accompanying text.
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holding title.259 The court in Nurad determined that, as contingent
remaindermen in a family trust, the defendants had no authority to
influence decisions and were subordinates in the corporate set-
ting.260 In Con-Tech, the court provided an instructive roadmap for
what a trustee must do to avoid liability, namely, that the trustee test
the property for contamination and proceed with the cleanup.2 6'
One solution to this confusion is addressed by Representative
John LaFalce's proposal, which simply exempts fiduciary trustees
and lenders from liability as owners or operators.2 62 This plan insu-
lates trustees from liability arising out of actions taken by previous
owners. Representative Curt Weldon's proposal provides broader
protection to both trustees and non-trustees by requiring all entities
to make appropriate inquiry into prior ownership and use of prop-
erty. In contrast, Senator Jake Garn's proposal deals specifically
with an unexercised capacity to control, as occurred in Bergsoe
Metal. The best solution to trustee CERCLA liability would be a
combination of these three proposals.
D. Tests for Liability
The variety of legal tests for trustee liability demonstrate the
complexity of the issue and the need for a simple, uniform ap-
proach to the problem. In Bliss, the court adopted a four-part test
which asked whether there was a facility, whether a release oc-
curred or was threatened, whether response costs were incurred,
and whether the statutory trustees were responsible persons. 263
The court's analysis in Burns hinged on whether the realty trust was
an owner or operator regardless of personal participation in any
management actions.264 In Quadion, the court framed the test in
terms of the ability to control actions and avoid damage. 265 The
court in Con-Tech first determined which NCP applied in order to
decide whether retroactive application of CERCLA was proper.2 66
The court then addressed which standard of compliance would be
259. Premium Plastics, No. 92-C-413, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16119, at *10. For
a further discussion of this case, see supra notes 137-46 and accompanying text.
260. Nurad, 966 F.2d at 844. For a further discussion of this case, see supra
notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
261. Con-Tech, No. 87-5137, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14624, at *28-29. For a
further discussion of this case, see supra notes 155-61 and accompanying text.
262. For a further discussion of Representative John LaFalce's proposal, see
supra notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
263. Bliss, No. 84-2086C(1), 1988 WL 169818, at *8-10.
264. Burns, No. C-88-94-L, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17340, at *5.
265. Quadion, 738 F. Supp. at 274-75.
266. Con-Tech, No. 87-5137, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14624, at *9-10.
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imposed and whether the action taken was a remedial or a removal
action. 267  From still another perspective, Uniroyal addressed
whether CERCLA liability survived a state corporate dissolution.268
The issues in Premium Plastics were whether the trustee held title as
an owner or operator and whether plaintiffs who were not joint
tortfeasors with defendants were entitled to contribution. 269 Nurad
focused on the authority-to-control test.2 70 Finally, the court in
Phoenix II used the owner or operator test to determine whether the
trustee was liable under CERCLA.271 In sum the courts used a lib-
eral construction to support the policy that responsible parties
should bear the burden of paying for cleanup.
In addition to the three federal legislative proposals, state solu-
tions are instructive in finding a solution to the trustee liability
problem. A fiduciary can properly act in an environmental setting
by inspecting property, preventing or remedying violations, refus-
ing to accept contaminated property and reaching settlements. Ad-
ditionally, the right to disclaim power otherwise granted by statute,
law or any other document, the power to decline to serve, and the
ability to charge the costs of cleanup against the trust are important
considerations. However, this does not instruct successive business
entities on how to avoid problems prior to acquisition. Of course,
the broadest solution a state could implement would be simply to
adopt the provision that a trustee or fiduciary is not an owner or
operator under CERCLA.
E. When a Trustee is Liable
Generally speaking, trustees may be liable for environmental
cleanup as owners under federal, state and common law theories,
and incur limited or unlimited personal liability. 272 The trustee can
be held liable under nuisance, intentional tort, negligence or strict
liability. 273
The law incorporating the basic principles of trustee liability
under CERCLA may be summarized in the following manner. First,
the court in Bliss held statutory trustees of a defunct corporation
liable for permitting disposal of hazardous waste to the extent that
267. Id.
268. Uniroyal, No. 91-C-1020-5, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14624, at *12-16.
269. Premium Plastics, No. 92-C-413, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16119, at *441.
270. Nurad, 966 F.2d at 837.
271. Phoenix I, 816 F. Supp. at 567-69.
272. Barnhill, supra note 6, at 845.
273. Id.
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corporate property and effects come into their hands. Second,
Burns found owners of a realty trust liable without personal partici-
pation in management. Third, the Quadion court held trustees
which were sole owners of a closely held corporation liable without
sufficient facts to pierce the corporate veil merely because they had
the responsibility to control activities and avoid damage. Fourth,
the Rollins court determined that a corporate liquidating trust was
liable because it stepped into the shoes of its predecessor. Fifth, the
court in Con-Tech decided that a trustee was not liable when it noti-
fied the regulators of pre-existing contamination and proceeded
with a private cleanup. Sixth, the Uniroyal court found that a liqui-
dating trustee is liable for surviving claims under CERCLA, even
though a state dissolution proceeding was initiated against its pred-
ecessor. Seventh, the court in Premium Plastics held that a land
trustee was not liable as an owner or operator by only holding title
to property. Eighth, Nurad held that contingent remaindermen of
a family trust are not liable when they lack the authority to control
decisions concerning the property. Finally, Phoenix H held a bank
acting as trustee of an estate with title to a landfill liable as an owner
or operator under the doctrine of res judicata when the bank was
previously determined to be an owner. 274
F. Pre-Acquisition: Avoiding Problems
When concerned about CERCLA liability, perhaps the most
critical juncture for the trustee or any other potential owner of
property is prior to acquisition. What should one do? Representa-
tive Curt Weldon's proposal would set the standard for appropriate
action by the trustee and provide uniformity. The list of specific
duties required in the Phase I Environmental Audit provides an ex-
tremely useful checklist which can easily be followed by the
practitioner.
Absent such a statutory enactment, the best pre-acquisition ad-
vice which a prospective trustee can receive from an attorney is to
identify and evaluate hazardous waste problems. The trustee
should seek to satisfy the standard of inquiry necessary to preserve
the innocent landowner defense if hazardous substances are discov-
ered on the land. There are several sources of information which
may be used in an environmental pre-acquisition investigation in-
cluding: hazardous waste site lists; federal government agencies;
state environmental agencies; past permits; environmental reports;
274. For a discussion of Phoenix II, see sUqra notes 128-36 and accompanying
text.
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compliance records; Security and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
records; county records; conversations with the seller, employees
and neighbors; law firms with a significant environmental practice;
and a physical inspection of the property. 275 Soil and water samples
could also be obtained from the property at the time of acquisition
to establish whether the site was free from contamination prior to
ownership. Finally, the trustee could demand that any contamina-
tion present be cleaned up prior to acquisition of the land. The
trustee can take several other measures to avoid liability prior to
acquisition of the property. Insurance against liability for cleanup
can be purchased.2 76 In addition, indemnities, warranties, and cov-
enants can also be obtained from the previous owner to protect the
trustee.
G. Post-Acquisition: The Industri-Plex Solution
There are four critical parts of the Industri-Plex Site solution
worthy of a closer analysis. Specifically, these are: (1) how to ad-
dress the problems of the innocent landowner; (2) status as owner
or operator; (3) status as trustee; and (4) the relationship of parties
to a Superfund cleanup.
Innocent landowners are dealt with primarily through the use
of the Remedial and Custodial Trusts. The Remedial Trust's pur-
pose is to perform the environmental cleanup. Once completed,
the Custodial Trust is used to ensure the land is clean prior to sale.
At least as to subsequent purchasers, the problem of being an inno-
cent landowner is avoided, because such a cleanup is a prerequisite
to sale. Whether the trustee is an owner or operator is addressed in
the consent decree. One mechanism is the imputed liability to the
settlors for liability incurred by the trustees. Additionally, EPA and
the State agree that trustees are not owners or operators. Accord-
ingly, the trustees are shielded from liability for past actions by
PRPs, and the tangled analyses of the federal cases are avoided.
Furthermore, trustee liability is addressed by the Remedial
Trust, Custodial Trust, and the long-term trust. The Remedial
Trustee is in charge of cleanup and is liable for negligence, gross
negligence, and willful misconduct. The Custodial Trustee is addi-
tionally liable for bad faith. The long-term trust is similar to the
Remedial Trust. It is important that cleanup duties and responsibil-
ities for sale and long-term holding of the property be separate be-
275. See Kathryn E.B. Robb, Environmental Considerations in Project Financing,
605 P.L.I. COMM. 543 (1992).
276. Barnhill, supra note 6, at 850.
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cause this avoids a judicial inference that the Custodial Trust and
the long-term trust are actively involved in property management.
Their positions are more analogous to the land trust, which has
been met with some measure of success in avoiding liability under
the judicial determinations analyzed in this discussion.
Most importantly, the relationship of the parties is essential to
the success of Industri-Plex Site. The Custodial Trust cleverly
makes EPA, the State, the City of Woburn and the Remedial Trust
beneficiaries. Two consequences result from this alliance. First, it
puts parties that are normally at odds on the same side. Thus, for
purposes of sale, all parties must be consulted to proceed. Further-
more, if there is not to be a sale of the property, that decision is also
made in consultation with the regulators. This unique blending of
the role of regulator with that of beneficiary ultimately fosters coop-
eration and financial gain. The incentive for reuse is strong for all
parties because they have a contingent interest in such sale, with
the sole exception of the trustee. Second, the long-term trust re-
solves an important problem of how to deal with the property which
cannot be resold. It manages the property by addressing this con-
tingency in tandem with the prospect of eventual sale. Assuming
sale is not possible, the long-term trust essentially resolves the issue
of retroactive liability, since that previously was addressed in the
Consent Decree as residing in the original settlors. Thus, the
trustee is removed from latent liability.
H. Is it Safe to be a Trustee?
It is safe to be a diligent trustee under CERCLA. There are
three keys to ensuring this safety. The first key is the pre-acquisi-
tion investigation. Regardless of the type of trust involved, the
trustee can take necessary measures to discover the status of the
property. Another key is to use due care in the management of the
site in carrying out fiduciary duties to ensure preservation of the
property for the beneficiary. Finally, the appropriate legal mecha-
nisms must be in place to protect the trustee. As demonstrated in
the Industri-Plex Site model, the use of the consent decree proved
instrumental in serving to protect the trustees of the Custodial
Trust and long-term trusts. In particular, the agreement with EPA
that the trustee was not an owner or operator, combined with the
imputed liability to the original settlors, provides a great deal of
safety to the prudent trustee. When the trustee does not make the
appropriate pre-acquisition inquiries or carry out his or her fiduci-
ary duties with diligence, the risk of liability increases. Even the
19951
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most sophisticated legal drafting cannot rescue inattentive behavior
from liability under CERCLA.
IX. CONCLUSION
Law through the centuries has adapted to the changing needs
of society. History shows the trust has been particularly adept at
solving problems that could not be resolved by legal remedies. The
law of trusts, adapted from English common law, has developed
and changed. In the modern context of environmental law, the
trust can help deal with pollution and hazardous waste. The time
has come to seek solutions to environmental problems. It is clear
that the trust can be a mechanism to meet that challenge, as it has
with others in the past, and enable responsible parties to return
damaged land to a useful and productive state.
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